The Rabin Assassination: Looking Back at a National Trauma

Dana Arieli-Horowitz, *Yoẓerim be'omes yeter: reẓaḥ Rabin, omanut upolitikah* (Creators in overburden: Rabin's assassination, art and politics). Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2005. 407 pp.

Lev Greenberg (ed.), *Zikaron bemaḥloket: mitos, leumiyut, vedemokratiyah* (Contested memory: myth, nation, and democracy). Beersheba: Humphrey Institute for Social Research, 2000. 169 pp.

Charles S. Liebman (ed.), *Reẓaḥ politi: reẓaḥ Rabin ureẓiḥot politiyot bamizraḥ hatikhon* (Political assassination: the murder of Rabin and political assassinations in the Middle East). Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1998. 160 pp.

Yoram Peri: *Yad ish beaḥiv: reẓaḥ Rabin umilḥemet hatarbut beyisrael* (Brothers at war: Rabin's assassination and the cultural war in Israel). Tel Aviv: Babel, 2005. 405 pp.

Yoram Peri (ed.), *The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 386 pp.

Writing in the wake of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and on the basis of a comparison between the United States and Italy, Sidney Verba once argued that, whereas major crises can have an integrative or disintegrative effect on a given society, they usually reinforce whatever tendency happens to be stronger.[1] Thus, in fragmented political cultures, national trauma invariably leads to a deepening of internal rifts rather than to their healing. Israel is a classic example of this second kind of body politic, so it is not surprising that the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995 led to an intensification of existing conflicts. Immediately after the tragedy, politicians of all persuasions expressed the hope that it would prove to be a transforming event that would bring Israelis together. However, this was not to be the case. After a very brief respite, politicians became engaged in a fierce debate regarding the causes of the assassination. This, in turn, led to a wide variety of accusations and counter-accusations and to a general escalation of tension in an already highly volatile political arena.

All the books reviewed in this essay reflect this situation in one way or another. Yoram Peri, a former aide of Rabin's, is at pains to point out that his work on the assassination does not derive from scholarly curiosity alone; it has also provided a form of solace or therapy in the wake of a highly traumatic event. The essays in the

volume edited by Charles S. Liebman are described by him as a blend between scientific analysis and personal reflections—a description that can be applied as well to Lev Greenberg's edited collection—whereas Dana Arieli-Horowitz's more recent collection of interviews with a number of prominent Israeli artists was specifically designed to examine their response to what was, for many of them, "a point of no return" (p. 11).

How did conflicts within Israeli society lead, perhaps inexorably, to Rabin's assassination, and how were they intensified by it? Some of the authors and contributors in these volumes put forward their own causal explanations of the assassination; others analyze the public discourse in order to delineate the various explanations offered by opposing sectors of the Israeli body politic.

In both *The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin*, an edited collection, and in his book *Brothers at War* (*Yad ish beaḥiv*), Peri points out that a reading of ancient and modern history draws attention to the ubiquity of assassinations and to the fact that they are particularly common in regimes characterized by a high level of violence and a low level of political legitimacy. In his view, the presence of these conditions in Israel made it more likely that an assassination would occur. Agreeing with Peri are a number of contributors to *The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin*. In an article titled "One More Political Murder by Jews," Nachman Ben-Yehuda analyzes a total of some 90 planned, attempted, and successful assassinations since 1882, the vast majority of which took place prior to the establishment of the state of Israel. Rabin's assassination, he contends, is the latest killing in a longstanding struggle for legitimacy between competing symbolic universes within Zionism. In contrast, while Ehud Sprinzak's essay, "Israel's Radical Right and the Countdown to the Rabin Assassination," focuses on recent political trends, he, too, argues that the assassination was the culmination of a process of delegitimization of the Labor government and of the prime minister at its helm.

Other contributors to Peri's volume arrive at a similar point from a more psychological perspective. In " 'Let Us Search Our Path': Religious Zionism after the Assassination," Aviezer Ravitsky shows how the personal identity of religious Zionists, which had been greatly enhanced by the settlement activity of Gush Emunim, suffered a blow with the rise to power of the Labor government and the ensuing peace negotiations with the Palestinians. This, combined with the widespread fear regarding the possibility of territorial concessions in the event of an agreement, made the resort to violence more likely. In a similar vein, Israel Urbach applies a number of concepts from his work on the suicidal behavior of individuals to help understand the phenomenon on a national level. In "Self-Destructive Processes in Israeli Politics," he contends that right-wing extremists found their messianic dream of a Greater Israel threatened by the Oslo accords; in consequence, both their own lives and those of others became completely meaningless.

Most of the contributors to *The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin* agree (with, of course, the benefit of hindsight) that the assassination was bound to happen. Why, then, did Israel's political leaders chose to ignore the "red lights and warning signals," the writing on the wall? According to Peri in *Brothers at War*, their failure was the outcome of a "false collective consciousness"—that is, a traditional and

deeply felt sense of Jewish victimhood, enhanced in the period following the Holocaust, which gave rise to a widespread belief that evil was an external phenomenon. Such a perception prevented both politicians and the general Israeli public from identifying internal sources of iniquity in general and violence in particular. Together with an unbounded confidence in the resilience of Israeli democracy and the prowess of the country's defense forces, this deceptive self-image led to a misplaced complacency before the assassination and to total shock in its wake.

The existence of a "false collective consciousness" is, I believe, highly doubtful. For one thing, the first war in Lebanon and the first intifada had already raised serious doubts about the efficacy of the Israel Defense Forces. Still more significant is the fact that for many years, particularly during the period of Likud rule from 1977 to 1984, the Labor party and its allies expressed concern about the level of political violence, some even predicting the outbreak of civil war.[2] There was, it seems, a tendency to exaggerate rather than to underestimate the internal sources of evil—which, according to the Israeli Left, were all to be found on the right of the political spectrum.

This argument reappeared in the wake of the assassination. As Peri and many of the contributors to his work and the other edited volumes point out, Labor leaders drew attention to the steady escalation of right-wing political violence in the years prior to the assassination. Time and again, they recalled the increasingly severe attacks against both Palestinians (from sporadic vigilante attacks to the "Jewish underground" of 1984, to Baruch Goldstein's massacre of Muslim worshippers in the Cave of the Patriarchs ten years later) and left-wing Jews (from the violence against the Labor party in the 1981 elections to the killing of Emil Greenzweig in February 1983). Significantly, however, their criticism was directed almost exclusively at the political and spiritual leaders of the secular and religious right-wing parties, or what is widely referred to as "the national camp" (*hamaḥaneh haleumi*), whose verbal violence (rather than the physical violence of their more extreme followers) was singled out as the root of the problem and the real danger to the stability of Israeli society.

Although the leaders of both the secular and the religious parties in the Likud-led coalition rejected the charges of verbal violence, they could not avoid dealing with them. In some instances, as Ravitsky points out, there were political and spiritual leaders who accepted these strictures, calling on their colleagues and followers to engage in soul-searching and mend their ways. But as Peri and others demonstrate, most of those accused of verbal violence and incitement rejected these allegations. At times, they charged that the Israeli Left was exploiting the action of a lone actor—"a wild weed" (*'esev shoteh*), as Rabin's assassin, Yigal Amir, was most often characterized—in order to stigmatize the nationalist religious camp to which he allegedly belonged. On other occasions, the blame was transferred to those on the Left. Thus, right-wing parliamentary and extra-parliamentary leaders, both secular and religious, contended that "the war of words" in the early 1980s had actually been sparked by the incessant incitement against Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon during the Lebanon War that emanated from its opponents on the Left. They also made frequent reference to certain deprecatory remarks, attributed to Rabin, putting down the Jewish settlers and their opposition to the Oslo accords—arguing, in effect, that the assassination was a victim-precipitated crime.

In this way, the debate following the assassination did not revolve around the perpetrator, but rather around those who allegedly incited him. In sum, both sides sought to divest themselves of responsibility by placing the blame firmly on their political opponents. However, as is usually the case, their arguments tended to reinforce rather than change peoples' attitudes and, in so doing, exacerbated the already deep divisions in Israeli society.

Not surprisingly, with the passage of time, the debate over responsibility for Rabin's assassination has become less pervasive. It now tends to take place primarily during the period leading up to the annual remembrance day and has become part of the broader issue of how best to commemorate both the event and Rabin's memory. But the major protagonists and underlying issues remain the same: the ''peace camp'' and the ''national camp'' are still pitted against each other, with each seeking to promote its own reading of the event while simultaneously rebutting the views of its political rivals.

Writing about ''the struggle to forget'' in *Brothers at War*, Peri notes that there was a great deal of opposition to establishing an official remembrance day. It took almost two years for the Knesset to enact the required legislation; since then, Peri claims, representatives of the nationalist camp have used their positions and influence to play down the importance of the Rabin assassination in schools and other state institutions (pp. 196–197). The Left, for its part, has continually criticized Likud-led governments for failing to give due recognition to Rabin's ''peace legacy'' in official commemoration ceremonies held at the Knesset and at Rabin's grave on Mount Herzl. In consequence of this perceived effort to blur the message of Rabin's life and legacy, leaders of the ''peace camp'' hold their own annual rally in Rabin Square, the site of the assassination. In this way, they ensure that their message gets across, albeit mainly to their own followers.[3]

In general, the apparent impossibility of reaching consensus over the Rabin legacy and the lessons to be learned from his assassination have led to a depoliticization of official commemoration activities. Peri notes that, in the mass media, the focus is increasingly on individuals' private recollections of Yitzhak Rabin, particularly during the period before he entered politics. At the same time, Ministry of Education commemorative programs are now likely to emphasize very general issues such as violence in the schools and in the society at large, rather than the assassination itself (pp. 217–221). Unable to agree on the political significance of Rabin's life and death, both the governmental agents of memory and the mass media choose in the main simply to avoid it.

Lev Greenberg's edited collection, *Contested Memory* (*Zikaron bemaḥloket*), also takes up this question. In an essay titled ''Commemorating Yitzhak Rabin and Commemorating His Commemoration,'' Michael Feige describes the widespread tendency to evade the substance of the issue by relating more to the act of commemoration than to what is actually being commemorated—with car stickers declaring that ''we will not forgive and we will not forget'' or enjoining others ''to remember and not to forget'' capturing the essence of this trend. In her article in this collection, ''Between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv,'' written only three years after the assassination, Vered Vinetsky-Seroussi points out that there are many who feel no need to remember Rabin, as is made manifest by the different approaches of Israel's

two largest cities to Rabin's commemoration. Although the prime minister, in accordance with official protocol, was buried on Mount Herzl and made an honorary citizen of the nation's capital, the municipality deemed it sufficient to name only one road after him (albeit the one leading to the new complex of government buildings), and even this was done with very little fanfare long after Rabin's death. In contrast, the Tel Aviv municipality immediately altered the name of the place where the assassination occurred, from Kings of Israel Square to Rabin Square. The different responses of the country's two major cities, in Vinetsky-Seroussi's view, both reflect and reinforce the rift between the secular Left and the religious Right. In the eyes of many, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem have come to represent rival worldviews within Israeli society.

The contrasting images of Israel's two metropolises—"the eternal capital of the Jewish people" versus "the city that never stops"—provide an ideal backdrop for an examination of Dana Arieli-Horowitz's *Creators in Overburden* (*Yoẓerim be'omes yeter)*,[4] a collection of interviews with Israeli artists who, according to Arieli-Horowitz, view themselves as "the hub of Israeli secularism" and who, in contrast to the country's political elite, continue to grapple seriously with the Rabin assassination.

Not all artists, of course, react in the same way. There are those who decided not to respond to the assassination (and other political events) in order to avoid sinking into depression. David Gerstein, for instance, feels that doing art for art's sake is "an existential need" and is "a way of saving one's soul" in an overpoliticized society such as Israel (pp. 15–16).[5] According to Arieli-Horowitz, however, other artists who previously felt this way changed their mind in the wake of the assassination, seeing it as an attack on their most cherished values. Moreover, almost all the artists interviewed in this volume understand their political role as being very different from that of the rival political and ideological camps in the debate over the legacy of Yitzhak Rabin—each with its own leaders and followers. They are derisive of works that take the form of propaganda for a particular cause and instead advocate the use of art as a way of making people think. Moshe Gershuni, for instance, argues that this is an inherent feature of painting: as the only non-linear art form, it cannot provide solutions but is rather like "a system of question marks" serving to open the minds of the audience (p. 73).

The ways in which the artists have gone about this task have varied in accordance with their understanding of the significance of Rabin's assassination. Those who see it as an infringement of universalistic values tend to relate to Yitzhak Rabin as a private citizen rather than as the person who symbolized the body politic. A number of artists chose to focus on an impersonal feature of the event—the bloodstains rather than the victim—in order to emphasize the tragedy of any loss of human life. This stance is best exemplified in a painting by Deganit Brest, in which words spoken by the doctor on duty that night at Ichilov hospital are placed in the center of the canvas: unaware of the identity of the injured person before him, the doctor had described Rabin as "an old man in a suit" and as "a very old man with a face as white as snow." In contrast, those artists who saw the assassination in more particularistic terms—as a threat to the solidarity of Israeli society or as a serious breach of Jewish tradition—resorted to completely different themes. Most often,

they incorporated biblical motifs and other Jewish iconography into their work, with many direct references (or more subtle allusions) to the sacrifice of Isaac, the Sixth Commandment prohibiting murder, or traditional mourning customs. Artists in this group attempted to show how Yigal Amir had committed a heinous crime even in terms of the tradition he claimed to represent.

A number of the interviewees make mention of the fact that the nationalist camp has not produced any significant artistic response to the assassination. Some of them attribute this to the Israeli Right's lack of need or desire to relate to the murder of a political leader who was prepared to give up parts of the holy land to the Palestinians. Others adopt a much more radical stance. The sculptor Buki Schwartz, for instance, contends: "Art is on the Left. Art is done by people who are concerned about human rights and about man as man rather than relating to people as creatures that you can destroy and kill because they are expendable at that particular time" (p. 47). In his opinion, and in that of many other artists interviewed here, those in favor of a Greater Israel have not simply failed to produce an artistic response to the assassination; their lack of humanitarian values makes them totally incapable of doing so.

The controversy surrounding the Oslo accords, which formed the backdrop for events leading to Rabin's assassination, is seen by all the authors and contributors in these volumes as part of a much broader struggle over the shaping of the collective Israeli identity. In an address given on the third anniversary of the Rabin assassination, the historian and former Labor foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami used a term that has become increasingly popular in the United States—"culture war"—in describing the split between the "Jewish" and the "Israeli" side of the body politic. According to Ben-Ami, the common demominator of the nationalist camp is not its stance on the territorial issue but rather its "revolt against the state of Israel" (*Contested Memory*, p. 154).

Taking this idea a step further, Peri bases much of his analysis in *Brothers at War* on the dichotomy between "retro" (conservative) and "metro" (cosmopolitan) culture that was articulated by John Sperling following the 2004 presidential elections.[6] Summarizing the significance of the Israeli "great divide," Peri writes:

> We are talking about two worldviews that are based on conflicting visions of man and the world. The differences of opinion relate to issues such as religion and the church, the environment, human rights . . . and many other matters from the right to hold firearms to the right of the United States to determine by force the nature of the regime in states around the world (p. 74).

Of course, the areas of controversy in Israel are, in certain cases at least, very different from those in the United States. However, after analyzing conflicts regarding Israeli collective identity—among them, the clash between those who see themselves primarily as Jews and those who regard themselves first and foremost as Israelis; between citizens whose principal allegiance is to the state of Israel and others who are committed above all to the land of Israel—Peri concludes that in Israel, as in the United States, there is a great divide between "retro" and "metro," and that the debate concerning the assassination and legacy of Yitzhak Rabin must be looked at within the context of this culture war.

It should be noted that Peri, Vinitsky-Seroussi, and other authors who point to a dichotomy between conflicting cultures, ideologies, or symbolic universes within Israeli society describe "ideal types" rather than providing a complete and accurate representation of the competing worldviews. In particular, they draw attention to the widespread acceptance of ethno-nationalism rather than political nationalism as the basis for membership in the Israeli collective, even among adherents of the supposedly cosmopolitan and universalistic "metro" culture. Thus, as Amnon Raz-Krokotzkin points out in his contribution to *Contested Memory*, titled "The Rabin Legacy: On Secularism, Nationalism and Orientalism," the propensity to adopt a particularistic stance is evidenced not only by the longstanding discrimination against Israeli Arabs, but also by the nature of the public discourse about the Rabin assassination and, more broadly, about the secular-religious divide in Israel, which is always conceived as being solely of an intra-Jewish nature. Paradoxically, therefore, public discourse on this matter emphasizes the common denominator between Jews on both sides of the divide, while excluding the country's Arab citizens from discussion.

Moreover, with regard to Rabin's assassination, Raz-Krokotzkin argues that the secular Left camp was able to "decontaminate" itself by placing causal responsibility on the national religious camp, and thereby retain its enlightened self-image.[7] Yet the truth of the matter, Raz-Krokotzkin maintains, is that Yigal Amir's heinous crime is attributable to Zionism as a whole, not just its religious-messianic interpretation. In other words, this crime is best understood in relation to the nationalistic elements of Jewish identity, common to both camps, rather than the religious elements that are primarily the province of only one camp.

This stance has garnered very little support beyond the small but vocal group of post-Zionist scholars. A more common tendency, as noted, has been to reconstruct Rabin's biography and to create a new version of him as an Israeli culture hero. As Haim Hazan points out in his contribution to *The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin*, titled "Rabin's Burial Ground: Revisiting the Zionist Myth," the official "agents of memory" have sought to emphasize the universally human elements of the Zionist ethos at the expense of its more specifically nationalistic features. By including only those elements of Rabin's life story that were incommensurate with the assassin's ideological stance, those who eulogized the prime minister created a distance not only between the perpetrator and his victim, but also between their own symbolic universe and that of Yigal Amir's ideological collaborators.

More than a decade has elapsed since the Rabin assassination. Over time, there have been manifold changes in the alignment of forces in the Middle East, some of which are noted in these volumes. In *Brothers at War,* for instance, Peri examines the responses both to the assassination of Rehavam ("Gandhi") Zeevi, the leader of the right-wing Moledet party, by Palestinian terrorists in October 2001, and to the Israeli disengagement from Gaza and northern Samaria in August 2005. In fact, the debate surrounding these two events proceeded on essentially the same lines as did that regarding the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. These, too, were part of the ongoing culture war in Israeli society. Unfortunately, however, Peri's analyses are tainted by a certain lack of objectivity and seem to be unduly swayed by his concern to honor Yitzhak Rabin's memory and legacy.

Peri, of course, is well aware of the extent to which biographies are a social construct. He himself draws attention to the different ways in which Rabin's colleagues and followers have reconstructed his life history and even iconized him in the wake of the assassination. Nevertheless, he finds it difficult to adopt this neutral stance toward those who created a less flattering portrait of the prime minister. Instead of analyzing the logic of their retrospective interpretations, he admonishes them for undermining Rabin's legacy and minimizing the significance of his assassination.

This problem is particularly acute in Peri's treatment of the aftermath of Zeevi's assassination. He points to the favorable reconstruction of Zeevi's life history and to the ways in which the reaction to his death mirrored that engendered by Rabin's assassination. Everything was the same, he notes, from the granddaughter's eulogy at the funeral to the establishment of an institute in the victim's memory. However, rather than accepting these responses as a legitimate expression on the part of a rival ideological camp, Peri castigates what he calls "the Rabinization of Gandhi" and bemoans the negative effect this has allegedly had on the commemoration of Rabin's life and death (pp. 225–227).

Brothers at War was written during the protracted and often bitter struggle over the disengagement plan. In his opening chapter, Peri lists the different means by which the leaders of the "orange campaign"[8] questioned the legitimacy of the government's decision to withdraw from settlements in Gaza and northern Samaria, in particular, the claim made by Ariel Sharon that "the fate of Netzarim is the same as that of Tel Aviv." Thus, according to its opponents, the disengagement plan was a violation of a campaign promise that had moved many voters to choose the Likud rather than one of the smaller and more extreme right-wing parties. While accepting the veracity of this claim, Peri dismisses it on the grounds that many foreign leaders (as well as previous Israeli prime ministers) had behaved in exactly the same manner. Ehud Barak, Benyamin Netanyahu, and—most importantly for him—Yitzhak Rabin had all taken a rigid stance on the occupied territories during election campaigns but had adopted more flexible policies after gaining office. Breaking promises is nothing out of the ordinary; everyone does it because, as leading Israeli politicians have been wont to say (in the words of a popular Hebrew song), "what you see from here, you don't see from there." At the same time, Peri is highly critical of the leaders of the nationalist religious camp who used the issue of broken promises against Sharon, castigating them for appealing to democratic principles that they themselves do not believe in. Rather than viewing this kind of discourse as a legitimate means of gaining political support against the disengagement, Peri portrays it as "a tactic designed to please the ear of innocent Israelis" (pp. 67–68).

As noted, Peri's book went to press at the height of the controversy about the disengagement plan and before it was actually implemented. It therefore makes no mention of the restraint shown by the vast majority of settlers and their supporters and, even more importantly, the moderating influence of their spiritual mentors at the time of the withdrawal. This rather unfortunate timing was most probably due to the desire to bring out the book in time for the tenth anniversary of Rabin's assassination. Had it been released a little later, Peri would have had the opportunity to relate to the gap between the rhetoric and actions of the nationalist religious camp on

this occasion, and this in turn may have led him to a more nuanced reading of "retro" culture.

Authors differ regarding the depths of disagreement between the rival camps in Israeli society and the extent of support within the nationalist religious camp for the use of illegal and even violent means to further its cause. Many of them, however, are of the opinion that there is a severe crisis of legitimacy. In his essay in *The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin* titled "At the Last Moment," Gadi Yatziv points out that this crisis does not stem from a feeling that the state is unable to meet the demands and expectations of its citizens, as is the case in many western countries. Rather, in certain sectors of the nationalist religious camp, there is a basic questioning of the government's right to rule.

It is this kind of stance that prompts Michael Walzer's call for a "politics without God." In "Democracy and the Politics of Assassination," which appears in the Liebman collection, Walzer argues that the increasing influence of religion in the public realm leads to an understanding of political issues in absolute terms and consequently leaves no room for any kind of give and take. For this reason, Walzer insists, Israel should follow the example of many other western democracies and separate religion and state. Politics should be limited to more mundane issues, whereas the search for truth and the work of redemption should go on elsewhere.

The present state of mind of the religious Right suggests that bringing it around to this point of view is a tall order. In this regard, however, two points must be borne in mind. First, the nationalist religious camp is much more heterogeneous than Peri and many of the authors in his and the other edited volumes would have us believe.[9] Second, and even more important, religious Zionism before the Six-Day War was of a very different ilk. It stood for "Torah va'avodah," the integration of Torah with worldly pursuits, a balance between tradition and modernity. Albeit today very much in the minority, there are still those within religious Zionism who believe in an alternative to what Walzer aptly refers to as the politics of ultimacy. All those in favor of recreating such a synthesis—including, ironically enough, adherents of the future-orientated "metro" culture—should hope for the realization of the traditional Jewish plea that our days be renewed as of old.

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Notes

1. Sidney Verba, "The Kennedy Assassination and the Nature of Political Commitment," in *The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public: Social Communication in Crisis*, ed. Bradley S. Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker (Stanford: 1965), 357.

2. For a detailed analysis of this stance, see Gerald Cromer, "The Voice of Jacob and the Hands of Esau: Verbal and Physical Violence in Israeli Politics, 1977–1984," in *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 18, *Jews and Violence: Images, Ideologies, Realities*, ed. Peter Y. Medding (New York: 2002), 149–167.

3. Significantly, this annual rally is held on the Saturday night closest to November 4. Official ceremonies, in contrast, take place on the 11th of Heshvan—the Hebrew anniversary of Rabin's death.

4. "Yoẓerim be'omes yeter" is better translated as "overburdened creators."

5. Although Arieli-Horowitz quotes Gerstein in her introductory chapter, the interview itself does not appear. This is unfortunate, given the fact that his stated views seem to differ greatly from those of the other artists.

6. John Sperling, Suzanne Helburn, Samuel George, John Morris, and Carl Hunt, *The Great Divide: Retro vs. Metro America* (Sausalito: 2004).

7. This term is borrowed from an intriguing analysis of the response to the assassination of former Italian prime minister Aldo Moro in 1978. See Robin Erica Wagner-Pacifici, *The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as Social Drama* (Chicago: 1986).

8. The color orange was adopted as an identifying feature of the campaign against the disengagement plan; over time, opponents of the plan became known as "the oranges" (*haketumim*).

9. This point is made very forcefully in an article written by Asher Cohen and Stuart Cohen, "Mah atem roẓim mehaẓiyonut hadatit," *Haaretz* (29 Nov. 2005).