# Contents

*Introduction*

# Collective Identities, States and Globalization: Exploring the Legacy of SN Eisenstadt

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The crushing of two jet airplanes into the Twin Towers in New York in 2001 has been stamped on the consciousness of most people in the world today. Similar powerful images came through videos of bombing in Kosovo (1999), Moslem riots in Christian Europe, brutal reprisals of protest in China (1989/2008), terrorist attacks in Israel, Kenya, Thailand, Turkey, Spain, India, and England (all through the last decade), and tribal warfare and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and Sudan in Africa. The most recent face of this move toward global instability was apparent in the war in Georgia, where Russia clearly declared its wish to regain an empire position. This wave of global shocks followed a trajectory of a different sort, one that signaled an opposite trend, namely global integration. At the end of the 1980s, for example, the world witnessed the fall of the "Wall" in Berlin (1989), as well as the end of communism in the USSR (1990) and apartheid in South Africa (1990). More and

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more countries adopted democratic political regimes, and an integrated global community seemed to be realized.

These global events—whether they worked toward integration or disintegration—challenged the basic beliefs of people in the Western world, and many found themselves grappling with the perennial question of modernity: Where is the world going? Are we attaining perpetual peace, as Immanuel Kant envisioned at the outset of the Enlightenment (Habermas 1997; Kant 1972), or are we simply in the midst of 'perpetual war'? (Divine 2000). How are we, indeed, to understand recent historical developments vis-à-vis the role of states? How can we come to terms with seemingly opposing historical shifts, one pointing toward a globalizing and integrated world, the other toward tribalism and Balkanization?

Whilst some scholars optimistically argue that some of the early events in the aforementioned "series" of traumatic changes mark the advent of globalization and "the end of history"—namely the elimination of non-liberal and non-democratic ideologies down into the dustbin of history—others faced them with great caution and predicted an impending "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1993). Social scientists were indeed baffled by these surprising and unpredictable events, and began questioning the foundational assumptions of their disciplines (e.g. Geertz 2000). Consequently, during the last two decades social thinkers began to critically delve into the core visions of modernity while trying to describe and explain mixed, ambivalent, and contradictory processes that reflect the complexity of recent historical shifts.

This book addresses some of these questions. Originating in the Holberg Memorial Prize awarded to SN Eisenstadt—himself a master thinker of modernity and globalization (Eisenstadt 1999a, 1999b, 2000)—it brings together highly qualified and esteemed scholars, who answered the call to revisit the simple questions raised above in a nuanced, comparative, and empirically supported manner. Following the Holberg award ceremony in November 2006 in Bergen, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, under the initiative of the Holberg fund and their financial support held an international conference in June 2007 to both celebrate the event and use it to further the intellectual dialogue around professor Eisenstadt's prolific research project on "multiple modernities" and the "Axial age." Culminating in this book, it brought together a select group of scholars to rethink the tensions and contradictions of states and globalization within the larger frame of modernization. Though the ensuing papers collected here vary in foci

and context, they all address issues of modernity, the nation state, and globalization.

The basic tenet underlying the call for papers was that social thought and thoughts about the social world are always enmeshed in dynamic contexts, be they cultural, political, or historical (Camic and Gross, 1998; Kurzman and Owens 2002; Swidler and Arditi 1994). Therefore, the global traumatic events of the last two decades triggered new intellectual assessments of modernity, states, and globalization. By tapping on these new assessments, the Holberg conference maintained an intellectual tradition, furthering prior assessments of modernity and of the vicissitudes of nationality and multiculturalism, which followed the First and the Second World Wars. Engaging with fundamental questions on these recent historical changes, we set an intellectual context that allowed our contributors to freshly deliberate questions concerning states, globalization, and collective identities.

Complementing an immense body of scholarship on globalization and states (Appadurai 2001; Bauman 1998; Beck 2000; Castells 1996; Giddens 1999; Held & McGrew 2000; Hirst & Thompson 1995; Robertson 1992; Sassen 1996, 1998; Stiglitz 2003; Strange 1996;), the present book tackles these topics whilst moving from general conceptual issues onto observations from peripheral standpoints. This perspective "from below," or rather from the "fringes" of global processes, focuses on issues of new forms or claims for citizenship, on recent waves of migration, and on forced exile—in Europe, Israel, the USA, and South America. Interestingly, most of the contributors to the book have personally experienced transition and movement, and are therefore keen to provide a rich and empirically-sound analysis of states and globalization as seen from peripheral positions. Another interesting fact is that Eisenstadt's initial publications—well before his study of modernity and its multiple faces—revolved around the issue of migration and peripherality (Eisenstadt 1955). Viewed from historical and comparative perspectives, global movements, conflicts and realignments state that "nothing is new under the sun," namely that global movements and communal transitions are the *sine qua non* of humanity. Furthermore, it could be argued that migration-centered countries like the USA and Israel provide fertile cases through which global trends and local adaptations may be generalized, but it is nonetheless important to keep those cases in a comparative framework (e.g. vis-à-vis Western or Easter Europe or Canada).

This comparative outlook thus orients the present book, presenting some of the main themes discussed during the Holberg conference. The chapters reflect upon the historical roots of the analysis of the nation-state as the embodiment of modernity. They also tackle questions over the contradictions and self-negation engendered by the implementation of modern conceptions of statehood in polity and policy. The emphasis of the authors on marginality, migration, Diaspora, and exile—most of them coming from the periphery and being migrants themselves—rekindles these classical discussions by seeing the global from the peripheral, and states and globalization from the local.

In order to set the stage for these deliberations on globalization and states, we first present the backdrop of the Enlightenment and modernity. Building on this scaffold, we then reveal the orienting themes of the call for papers for the Holberg Jerusalem conference. We then expand on these themes and contextualize the individual contributions within this framework.

## The Enlightenment and States—Persistent Strains in Utopia

The Enlightenment—the intellectual movement that transferred control over human affairs from God to Man—was translated politically into concrete social orders through the revolutions in the USA and France. These serve as convenient starting points in discussing the predicaments of modernity and the state. The philosophers of the 18th century—British, French, and German—introduced new utopian ideas about possible political orders that promised the attainment of "the good society." In placing human reason as the ultimate source and standard for deciding on legitimate social and political orders, they promulgated the idea that a "final solution" is just around the corner in historical development. In France, for example, the *philosophes* put human reason at the center stage and promised to replace arbitrary and unjust political orders—religious, monarchical, or aristocratic—with more democratic and humane ones. By moving control over history from the Deity to Humanity, they allowed people to plan societies in ways that would maximize liberty, equality, fraternity, and meritocracy. By dissolving the monarchy and the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie believed that their re-formed collective—the new, modern nation state—would serve as the best and most rational means for furthering human interests; and they even envisioned that such rational administrations would opt to seek

global peace through cross-nation cooperation and commerce (Kant 1972). Nevertheless, the translation of the Enlightenment's ideas into political programs was saturated with contradictions or dilemmas. As Eisenstadt argues, the very concept of the nation-state is inherently contradictory: While the state is supposedly universal in orientation, the nation is exclusive and particularistic.

Indeed, the emerging political vision of the modern nation-state was based upon implicit assumptions that produced internal strains in facing historical developments. For example, the conception of the modern nation state was based on the morality of universality and egalitarianism, yet it was to be exclusive for the in-group only. The conception of the nation-state assumed that everybody—irrespective of gender, ethnicity, race, or religion—is entitled to the same rights. It largely assumed pre-contractual agreements over the basic values that underlay the social order, and in doing so implicitly implied commonality and shared primordialism. At the same time, however, participation in a nation-state was limited to members of the nation, be they French, American, or German. As Biernbaum shows (2008), participation in a nation-state often resulted in assimilation and similitude. It required foreign migrants—Moslems in Europe, for example—to align themselves with Christian Western traditions in order to be fully accepted as equal members of the nation. Furthermore, many states—tilting between local autochthony and colonial tendencies—attempted to secure political borders around homogeneous ethnic and language boundaries. The universal state was exclusive, its openness a chimera. After the Second World War, colonial retraction and migration from South to North or East to West challenged its fundamental premises.

Comparative and historical analyses suggest that the political program of the nation-state faced several challenges throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many nation-states had to tackle heterogeneity because they deemed it necessary to form a collective around common core values. One such example is provided by the attempt to impose a common language. In the USA, the English language won over Italian, Irish, Yiddish, and German; the Revolutionaries in France imposed French throughout the country, thereby eliminating the use of local dialects (e.g., Breton; Gascony); similar was the case in Bismarck's Germany. Actually, the existence of many dialects and languages was politically suspect, and all nation-states made tremendous efforts to subdue heterogeneity. Their violent effort to homogenize the area under their control included political surveillance,

cultural imposition, and at times even ethnic cleansing (through dispersion, exile, or elimination). More often, they imposed upon the population universal and mandatory schooling with national curriculums that forged common collective identities (Meyer et.al. 1997), at times successfully (e.g., France until the 1960s), at other times less so (Belgium). Another important institutional mechanism for engendering common collective identities was implemented through national armies, via universal conscription (e.g., Israel).

More generally, nation states have attempted to form a common collective identity through cultural homogenization. The effort in this direction was mostly made through nationalized systems of education, which transmitted common values and invented traditions. There are plenty of examples: The Soviet Union forced a communist belief system on different nations and cultural groups; Spain fought the separatist sentiment of the Basque minority; France refused to acknowledge cultural and religious rights for North-African immigrants of Moslem origin; the USA fought Native American tribes which aspired for cultural separatism; Israel imposed a Jewish-oriented curriculum upon its Arab citizens; and modern Turkey is an extreme case, as it opted to eradicate all primordial identities in constructing a modern, secular collective identity (Fortna 2002). Though each of these cases is historically and culturally unique, they all testify to the basic tension that the nation-state encapsulates. The attempt to combine different groups into a common national collective reflected the Enlightenment's belief in its righteousness, namely as a model which everybody would embrace as the ultimate solution for a just society; its belief in common nationality pushed it to engage in exclusionary practices which constructed a common collective identity.

The vision of the nation-state has been contested, however. Notwithstanding the pressure toward assimilation, cultural minorities have retained their distinct customs under oppression; and national minorities have silently kept political aspirations for autonomy or independence. Behind the façade of common nationality and cultural homogeneity loomed fermenting forces of critique, rebellion, and separatism. Consequently, the vision of the common nation-state was repeatedly challenged during the twentieth century. The First World War frustrated the belief in the Enlightenment, by exposing how national sentiments and the force of homogenization can lead to catastrophe. The Second World War—even more devastating in its consequences—again proved that nationalism may result in global war and destruction.

Following these shocking events, nation states and great powers have decided that national and cultural repression cannot solve the challenges and dilemmas of the modern nation-state.

During the second part of the twentieth century, therefore, some states—especially European ones—have tended to accommodate to these strains by adopting multicultural orientations—either in their political programs or in their cultural policies. The general historical trend turned toward multicultural policies, yet each country adapted through unique circumstances. For example, Scandinavian states allowed minorities to express their cultural uniqueness through the granting of different social and cultural rights, such as the Swedish regulation according to which all children in the educational system have the right to learn about their cultural heritage in their mother tongue. In the USA, African-Americans were finally granted equal rights; Germany, France and the Netherlands adopted more open migration policies; Israel replaced its "melting-pot" policy of absorption with a multicultural one—granting immigrant groups the freedom to form cultural and educational frameworks of their own.

Slowly, however, some of these changes increased political challenges rather than inhibiting them. In France, for example, debates over the "veil" resulted in political riots; in Israel, the Arab minority is demanding the eradication of the state's Jewish identity by emphasizing universal citizenship rights. And in Germany, people in local *länders* (e.g., Bavaria) now push for cultural revival and autonomy at the level of the local state. Again, the challenges in each country are unique, yet there is a global sense of agitation and unrest. In some places, such challenges burst into violent political challenges (e.g., the demolition of Yugoslavia in the Balkan wars); in others, they constantly challenge governments (e.g., the Basque in Spain). Essentially, then, multiculturalism proved to be a fragile political and social solution for the dilemmas embedded in the vision of the Enlightenment to the same extent as the era of assimilation and homogeneity. It could be argued that the seeds of the instability of multiculturalism were rooted in the very core of its liberal vision.

We place the present discussion of globalization within the context of this problematic melding of state and nation, and examine it as a new challenge in the cycle of threats to the modern nation-state. Globalization, indeed, is the latest in the ever-renewing cycle of challenges to the ideas and political programs of the Enlightenment. Like the modern states that it seems to challenge, the unifying vision of

universalism and globalization is a product of the Enlightenment. However, this "new" form threatens the *raison d'être* of the nation state—this time through new supranational as well as sub-national assemblages of power, interests, rights, and identities (Sassen 2006; 2009). It thus forces us to re-conceptualize the relations between the nation-state, its inner components, actors, and institutions (the sub-national level) and the different global processes threatening it (the supranational level).

## The Changing Place of the State in the Global World

Studies of the interface between globalization and nation states have identified two major and contradictory themes, one pointing to de-nationalization, the other toward re-nationalization. According to the first approach, globalization has weakened the regulating status of the classical nation-state. This mainly happened due to the rise of new actors such as multinational corporations (MNC's) and because transnational lobbies and movements have gradually taken its place in economic, social, political, legal and cultural spheres (Castells 1996). Furthermore, new global social movements and NGOs (e.g., Greenpeace, Amnesty International) have interfered in internal political processes which were formerly in the exclusive control of states. Some of those movements are religiously motivated, providing new charismatic foci that challenge—in the name of universalistic religious tenets—national primordial identities (e.g., Al Qaeda). Simultaneously, states' ability to control their territories or their populations has significantly decreased because of proliferating cross-border transactions. All these globally-induced processes de-nationalize states and weaken them.

The thesis of de-nationalization further argues that new political changes within states—including sub-national groups gaining power and influence in spheres that were formerly within exclusive state authority and sovereignty—are eroding its standing vis-à-vis other states and its own population (e.g., organizations in civil society that mobilize political parties and induce social change—the Israeli "four mothers" movement being a good example (Sela 2007). Such trends are apparent in the rise and strengthening of political entities with supranational components to them, most notably exemplified by the institutional characteristics of the European Union and the relatively new International Criminal Court (ICC). Again supporting the thesis of de-nationalization, these new

political arrangements have the authority to bypass and coerce decisions on the nation-state. Human-rights movements and institutions have actually enforced their agenda on modern governments, who in trying to legitimate their actions incorporated human-rights discourses in their own right (Meyer et. al. 1997).

The interface between globalization and the weakening nation state is further exemplified by the erosion of charismatic political centers of the classical state—previously associated with utopian political ideologies of the good society. Erosion of such centers leaves state administration—globalized in its own right—to run by simple and generalized models of efficiency and cost reduction (e.g., neo-liberalism). Some scholars go as far as to suggest that the cosmopolitan order of global society will eventually shrink the functions of the nation-state to the bare minimum of a distributive bureaucracy. Arguing in favor of the "withering-away" of the state, they call on social scientists to focus on global-level actors and process.

According to the second approach, states are still the dominant players in the international system. Instead of their withering away, they suggest that recent historical events prove that re-nationalization is on the rise (Kalb et. al., 2000; Gilpin, 2000). Acknowledging that some of the classical roles of the nation state are eroding, they insist that it is empowered by other internal and external forces that engender change and innovation in their functioning and in the institutional spheres through which they operate. Adherents to this school of thought suggest that in facing globalization, the nation-state adapted and fitted itself to benefit from technological and economic changes of the past decades. Moreover, they argue that nation states in fact now regulate globalization and are the driving force behind it. States regulate what flows across national borders, in which directions, and under what economic and political conditions. Thus, rather than weakening, states now enjoy new paths of action and opportunities that were previously unavailable to them (Weiss 1998, 2003), and they are actually more central as primary regulatory actors.

Furthermore, this approach suggests that like global economic changes, global terrorism has pushed nation-states to strengthen their policing power and capacity to control their borders. Under code names such as "the return of the nation state," "re-nationalization" and "bringing the state back in," scholars argue that the state is ever more relevant. Consequently, states remain central for the analysis of contemporary changes in the international arena. Scandinavian countries

might provide a case in point: Though critiques argue that the welfare state is withering away, Scandinavian countries—spurred by globalization—have found new ways to revitalize their welfare policies without losing control of their economy and society.

As Eisenstadt's oeuvre suggests, the way to assess these polar views is through a comparative and historical orientation, which negates either/or postulates. The two perspectives thus call for greater empirical attention to the specific arenas wherein these contradictory processes—of de-nationalization and re-nationalization—take place. These simultaneous processes create new complexities, in which some political arrangements are de-nationalized (for example, growing cross-border flows of capital, goods, environmental agendas and cultural values), while other functions, such as intra and inter-state security and tax collection, are further regulated by the state. These processes thus undercut simple attempts to explain contemporary global political developments, and require a more complex and multifaceted research agenda, based on a systematic comparison between different states and societies.

## The Chapters

This book tackles this debate through a historically-sensitive and empirically-robust set of papers which also share a common vantage point, namely the interface between globalization and states from peripheral positions. More specifically, the different chapters touch upon the effects of globalization on the weakening of the monopoly of nation states over collective identities and cultural boundaries. In what follows, we briefly review the central ideas of the chapters along a logical sequence that moves from conceptual statements to the more concrete peripheral vantage points.

S.N. Eisenstadt's analysis sets the stage for this discussion. It focuses on the relations between the reconstitution of collective identities on the one hand, and the themes, symbols, and movements of protest that developed, on the other. This introductory essay explores the major tensions and basic themes that the following chapters expand upon. Specifically, Eisenstadt contends that the most central foci of the modern collective identity, namely the modern nation and the revolutionary state, have been transformed recently. Yet, he claims, the latter has not necessarily been weakened. While the "classical" political centers of

some states, together with cultural domains such as science, have become less charismatic, the political centers of the nation states continue to constitute the major actors for distributing resources, and states are still the most important single actors in major international arenas.

Eisenstadt then points out that these developments entailed the decoupling of the basic components of the classical nation or revolutionary state: citizenship; collective identities; the construction of public spaces; and modes of political participation. These tendencies toward decoupling were reinforced by the development of new structural enclaves and social sectors in many societies, including new types of Diasporas and minorities such as Muslims in Europe and to some extent in the U.S., Chinese and possibly Korean diasporas in East Asia, the U.S., and Europe, as well as Jewish communities, especially in Europe. Do all these developments attest to the *exhaustion* of the program of modernity, or possibly to its transformation? Eisenstadt answers this question by turning to the basic characteristics of the new movements and ideologies of protest, which developed first in the West and then through the rest of the world from the 1960s on. These movements, gradually moving from focusing on problems of distribution to the "grammar of life," created a growing emphasis on the politics of identity, namely the constitution of the new religious, ethnic, and local collectivities and identities according to criteria radically different from those of the "classical" national or revolutionary identities, and often in open contestation with them. These various types of virtual religious, ethnic, and civilizational trans-territorial or trans-state collectivities in turn brought about an important repercussion, namely the development of strong tendencies to redefine boundaries of collectivities, and of new ways of combining "local," global, transnational or trans-state components.

According to Eisenstadt, these changes indeed went beyond the hitherto prevalent models of modernity, as embodied in the nation and revolutionary state, but they do not attest to the exhaustion of the cultural and political programs of modernity. A closer look at these various movements—both the "post-modern" and the various religious ones—shows that despite their variety, and the fact that they all criticize the grand narratives of modernity, they are still deeply embedded in the latter's cultural and political program. In other words, although they critique and define collective identities in new ways, they all embrace the project of modernity.

Following the basic themes introduced by Eisenstadt, Saskia Sassen addresses the era of epochal transformations we are now living in as one that conventional notions of globalization (or the "national" versus the "global" contest) only partially grasp. Instead, she argues that we are witnessing the multiplication of a broad range of partial, highly-specialized, global assemblages of bits of territory, authority, and rights. Formerly anchored in national institutional frameworks, she contends that the proliferation of 125 cross-border systems govern diverse processes inside and across nation-states. One such case, according to Sassen, is the *lex constructionis*, a private "law" developed by major engineering companies for establishing a common mode of dealing with the strengthening of environmental standards in different countries. Another is the International Criminal Court—the first global public court, which is not part of the supranational system and has universal jurisdiction among signatory countries. Thus, Sassen bluntly offers us to avoid master categories and the futile binary distinction between the nation-state on the one hand, and the global system on the other. Instead, she proposes a new framework for the analysis of social and political phenomenon that focuses on specialized assemblages as new types of territoriality. These include both "national" and "global" elements within them, while each individual aggregate instance evinces distinct spatio-temporal features.

John Hall provides yet another take on Eisenstadt's essay. He introduces the original position of Liberal Machiavellianism. According to Hall, this concept includes the realization that civil society 'normally' operates according to its own logic; the insistence that political consciousness is created by the demands of an interfering state; and the discovery that liberal inclusion can contain radicalism. In other words, Hall tackles the old dilemma, which Machiavelli struggled with as an advisor to princes, namely how to control a territory and prevent conflict between different classes and national groups. He contends that where liberal politics prevails, there is less chance for groups seeking to revolutionize the social order to succeed. He demonstrates this point all the way from imperial Russia through Quebec, India and Kashmir, and up to today's European Union. Through these comparative cases, he explores the ways in which Europe managed (sometimes poorly) the challenges posed by socialism and nationalism. Hall situates his discussion of Liberal Machiavellianism within the framework of Eisenstadt's work on collective identities and the nature of modern democracy. Yet, while Eisenstadt makes the case for collective identities

and the need democracies have to make room for them, Hall contends that the formation of class and national identities—both vital to modernity—depends entirely on the character of modern regimes. Briefly, politics—and specifically liberal politics stemming from Hobbesian reasons—matter, and are the route through which collective identities are forged and sustained in modern nation states.

The following chapter of Hedva Ben-Israel continues the discussion of political regimes and collective identities. More specifically, Ben-Israel analyzes the concept of nationalism. Examining its different meanings through history, she stresses the malleability of the concept. Thus, for instance, while in what she coins "the ideological age" nationalism meant to both free nations and to build a new and fraternal world, in the first half of the nineteenth century nationalism was associated with both political and social progressive ideas, and persecuted by reactionary governments. As a sentiment, Ben-Israel argues, nationalism has stayed flexible to this day, joining movements of liberation or imperialism, socialism or Fascism, but also decolonization and anti-imperialism. Accordingly, she stresses the need to study nationalism and the construction of national identities, within specific historical contexts. Finally, Ben-Israel applies some of her conclusions to the Israeli case, in which the search for solutions to a situation of mixed populations in a given national space moves back and forth between violence and dialogue, with particular vehemence due to the strength of extremist groups on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Tapping on Eisenstadt's analysis of collective identities in the national and societal level, Bernhard Giesen reflects upon the imagined dimensions of collective identity. He argues that these collective identities are embodied and enacted in mythical accounts and ritual performances. In the heart of a community's collective identity, Giesen argues, lies constitutive or transcendental references that are the sources of regularity and structure. Although these events and myths are extraordinary and exceptional, they generate order and are represented, imagined, and performed within "real" social life. Giesen distinguishes between three such ideal-types of constitutive transcendental myths, namely different ways of imagining the transcendental which are projected and constructed by a political community: charisma and sovereignty; the rule of the law and construction of deviance; and the void of meaning and memory of victimhood. The collective myths that Giesen's chapter portrays serve, among other things, as the social "glue" that—standing in the core of collective identity—enables communities to

stick together despite the challenges which undermine them. The following chapters, however, suggest that collective identities are constrained by internal and external threats that challenge their coherence, integration, and order.

Bjorn Wittrock's chapter examines the same basic tension between diversity and multiculturalism on the one hand, and the need to create one coherent national collective identity on the other. Wittrock explores this tension through a focus on linguistic diversity in Europe. He aims to explain the paradox of minority languages in Europe. Although today most European nations and the European Union committed themselves to promoting cultural diversity and the protection of minority languages, linguistic diversity is considerably smaller in Europe today than it was a century ago, at a time when concern for such diversity on the part of the powers was much smaller. Looking into this puzzling situation, he analyzes the experiences of two types of political order—composite monarchies (with empires as an extreme case) and nation-states—and outlines some of the mechanisms behind the long-term trends in language usage. More generally, the chapter touches upon the inherent tension between modernity as based on universalistic assumptions about human beings, their value and their capacities, and language, which although as a generic category is of course universal, its use is highly particularistic.

Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Judith Shuval continue this analytical move toward the dynamics of citizenship and exclusion by shedding light on the phenomenon of Diasporas and transnationalism. Specifically, they examine the latter's influence on the delicate multicultural mosaic of nation-states. Shuval dwells on the ambiguous and dynamic qualities of modern Diasporas, which are congruent with widespread globalization processes, through several examples, including the Ethiopian immigrants to Israel, who have re-asserted ongoing contact with their former homeland. Ben-Rafael, on his part, develops the analytical dimensions of the growing phenomenon of a specific kind of Diaspora—transnational Diasporas—and highlights the multiplicity of these Diasporas nowadays, at a time when ethnic diversity has become a salient feature of the social dynamics of many societies. This multiplicity, he claims, represents a significant change in social reality, far beyond the scope of "regular" migration. One of the prominent dimensions of these diasporas, as Ben-Rafael points out, is the retention of close and intensive links between the community of immigrants in the host country and its country of

origin, which commonly contrasts with the interests of the dominant culture in their new environments.

Like Shuval, Ben Rafael stresses the fact that Diasporas' growing presence and dominance in countries such as the UK, France and the U.S., is amplified and furthered by the effects of globalization. Thus, in an era characterized by worldwide interconnectedness of individuals, organizations, communities, and societies, and the blurring of national collective identities, these Diasporas thrive, and in many ways transcend the control and reach of the national authority of states.

Looking at the interface between globalization and states from a peripheral position, Mario Sznajder's chapter offers an in-depth analysis of globalization in Latin America. According to Sznajder, Latin American countries have lived through recurrent processes of globalization since the continent's incorporation into the European sphere of influence at the end of the fifteenth century. If so, he asks, how could it be that an entire region, so closely linked to the more developed areas of the world, and so dependent on them, does not occupy a central place when a new wave of globalization takes place? His answer points to populism. The chapter's main claim is that many areas in Latin America have internalized in their political and socio-economic cultures anti-globalizing features that surface in the form of political populism, strongly opposing some of the main characteristics of modern globalization. Sznajder explains the connection between populism and globalization as one of inverse proportion. Populism adds an integrative dimension to modernization through the attempt to create a new collective identity—the identity of the people. Yet, its basic formula is one in which the promise of close future redistribution, empowerment and integration are essential. This is not compatible with the neo-liberal agenda that stands in the heart of globalization. Moreover, the 'peripheric' elements of populism, such as assembly-style politics, charismatic leadership and presence, and the wideness of interclass alliance, cannot last long in socio-economic neo-liberal frameworks. These 'peripheric' elements of populism, as Sznajder emphasizes, are both politically and socio-economically contradictory in essence to populism itself.

Julia Lerner shifts the gaze toward the post-Soviet space—beyond the lands of the former Soviet Union and its successor states—and examines the large and heterogeneous Russian-speaking collective in Israel. This immigrant group represents part of the worldwide Russian-speaking Diaspora. According to Lerner, Russians in Israel use various

institutions and media channels to keep both aspects of their old cultural and political identity alive, along with their affinity to post-Soviet cultures and political formations. Thus, they meet their post-Soviet stage while relocating themselves as a bounded collective within the cultural and political reality of Israel. The chapter focuses on the specific manifestations of post-Soviet migration into post-Zionist Israel, while discussing the cultural and political consequences of this relocation. Lerner offers two examples of an attempt to link the analysis of the cultural change in post-Soviet Russia to the socio-cultural reality of Russians in Israel: the "Intelligentsia" and "Ethnicity," looking at them in the post-Soviet context, and analyzing their implementation in the Russian-Israeli arena.

Orit Gazit provides a different perspective on global-peripheral encounters, through the analysis of the experience of exile. Concretely, she explores identity construction of Latin American Jewish political exiles in Israel. These exiles, who fled from Latin America to Israel during the 1970s due to the political persecution of the military rule in Argentine, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil, suffered massive human rights violations, including imprisonment and torture. The chapter touches upon the ways in which political exile—as a key traumatic experience—can break one's previous identity, exposing it to processes of reflection and self-criticism, and resulting in the creation of a tangled and complex identity in the host country. Focusing on the unique features of these exiles in Israeli settings, the chapter offers an in-depth case study for understanding the processes that influence the creation of transnational identities in the age of globalization. At the same time, it sheds light on the consequences of suppression, persecution and human rights violations in some of the Latin American countries during the 1970's—a dark period in the continent's history.

Finally, following the same logic of looking at the construction of collective identities from a peripherial stance, Nina Witoszek sheds light on the case of East and Central Europe. Witoszek analyzes the cultural roots of the anti-totalitarian upheaval of the 1980s, which started with the establishment of the Polish Committee of Workers Defence (KOR) in 1976, and concluded in the Autumn of the Nations (1989-1991). She claims dissent in Eastern Europe was less an organized political movement and more a cultural "civilizing project" based on "oppositional humanism." Witoszek further claims that one of the main tools in the dissidents' civilizing mission was what may be called a *dialogic paradigm shift*: an ethical-philosophical awakening without

which the scope of workers' protest would have been transient and particularistic, and it would not have gained the proportions of a massive moral revolution. Though liberating, Witoszek argues that the oppositional humanism that East Central European dissidents espoused is potentially a problematic project: it has the potential of construing a collective identity that tolerates no difference and no dialogue.

## Acknowledgments

In the tradition of Eisenstadt's teaching, this book is aimed to be an "opening"; it is, in a sense, a call for deliberation, discussion, and expansion. As fitting the call for nuanced, comparative, and empirically infused assessments of change, the papers collected here do not reflect "a school" or a pre-conceived theoretical dogma. They detail ideas, assess ideas, and criticize perspectives—but they neither advocate any single orientation nor suggest one "direction" or one "thesis" as an ultimate, final position. Known for this pragmatic and comparative approach, this school of sociology—a child of Eisenstadt's immense impact in Israel (see Yair and Apeloig 2006)—had a rare opportunity to celebrate the work of its founder.

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